Employee volunteering and management control in cooperative settings by Yang, Di
 EMPLOYEE VOLUNTEERING AND MANAGEMENT CONTROL 




























In Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree 
Doctor of Philosophy in Accounting in the 












COPYRIGHT © 2018 BY DI YANG 
  
brought to you by COREView metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk
provided by Scholarly Materials And Research @ Georgia Tech
EMPLOYEE VOLUNTEERING AND MANAGEMENT CONTROL 




























Dr. Xi Kuang, Advisor 
Scheller College of Business 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
 Dr. Jeffrey Hales 
Scheller College of Business 




Dr. Michael Majerczyk 
J. Mack Robinson College of Business 
Georgia State University 
 Dr. Kathy Rupar 
Scheller College of Business 




Dr. Shankar Venkataraman 
Scheller College of Business 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
  
   






 I am deeply grateful to my advisor, Jason Kuang, for his guidance and support in 
developing this project. I also thank my committee members Jeffrey Hales, Michael 
Majerczyk, Kathy Rupar, and Shankar Venkataraman for their invaluable guidance. I am 
also thankful for the helpful comments from Eric Condie, Kathryn Holmstrom, Wenqian 
Hu, Jonathan Kugel, Siman Li, Anish Menon, Jordan Samet, Arnold Schneider, and 
workshop participants at University of Waterloo and University of New South Wales. I 
gratefully acknowledge the financial support provided by Ray C. Anderson Center for 













TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS iii 
LIST OF TABLES v 
LIST OF FIGURES vi 
SUMMARY vii 
CHAPTER 1. Introduction 1 
CHAPTER 2. Background and Literature Review                                                     6 
2.1       Cooperation Issues in Team Settings 6 
2.2       Management Control Mechanisms 7 
2.2.1 Formal Control Mechanisms and Economic Motives 8 
2.2.2 Social Motives 9 
2.3       Employee Volunteering Programs 13 
2.3.1 Benefits of CSR 14 
2.3.2 Employee Volunteering Programs 15 
CHAPTER 3. Hypotheses Development 20 
3.1 The Signaling Value of Volunteering 20 
3.2       Strategic Considerations 24 
CHAPTER 4. Methodology 27 
4.1 Experimental Design 27 
4.2       Experimental Procedure 30 
CHAPTER 5. Results 33 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 33 
5.2       Hypotheses Tests 34 
5.3       Supplemental Aanalyses 37 
CHAPTER 6. Conclusion 41 
APPENDIX A. Experimental Instrument --- Stage One 44 
APPENDIX B. Experimental Instrument --- Stage Two 45 




LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1     Descriptive Statistics for Cooperation                                                          33 
Table 2     Results of Hypotheses Tests                                                                         36 






LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1     Payoff Table for the Stage-Two Task                                                          28 
Figure 2     Timelines of the Strategic and Non-Strategic Conditions                           32 
 vii 
SUMMARY 
This study experimentally investigates whether employee volunteering programs 
can serve as an informal control mechanism that improves cooperation in team settings. I 
posit that employees who participated in volunteering programs are more likely to be 
conditional cooperators, who are willing to cooperate if others also cooperate, and use 
others’ volunteering behavior as a signal of their type. I also posit that the effectiveness of 
this signal in facilitating cooperation depends on the perceived credibility of the signal. In 
the experiment, participants make a volunteering choice and then are paired to play a 
contextualized prisoners’ dilemma game. As predicted, I find that, when volunteering 
appears non-strategic, the cooperation rate is higher when the paired participants both 
volunteered than otherwise. However, when volunteering could be strategic, the 
cooperation rate does not differ significantly, regardless of whether one or both of the 
paired participants volunteered. Implications of these findings for research and practice are 
discussed. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, corporate social responsibility (CSR) has drawn considerable 
attention from both practitioners and scholars. Over 90 percent of Fortune 500 firms have 
explicit CSR initiatives (Kotler and Lee 2004). Given the large amounts of resources 
invested in CSR, it is important to understand whether and how such investments create 
value for the firm, in addition to their societal benefits. Prior research has provided 
evidence that CSR engagement benefits firms in different ways, such as increasing 
employees’ morale and lowering the cost of capital (e.g., Balakrishnan et al. 2011; 
Dhaliwal et al. 2011). This study investigates the spillover effect of a specific type of CSR 
initiative, employee volunteering programs, in cooperative settings.    
Employee volunteering programs are a popular form of CSR initiatives. Surveys 
find that over 90 percent of Fortune 500 companies offer employee volunteering programs 
(Boccalandro 2009), and the number of firms that adopt such programs has increased 
steadily over time (Deloitte 2010). A typical volunteering program gives employees paid 
time off to volunteer and/or matches employees’ volunteer hours with monetary or product 
donations. For example, the Timberland Company gives employees up to 40 paid hours off 
per year to volunteer and Google matches every 5 hours of volunteering with $50 corporate 
donation. A major difference between volunteering programs and other forms of CSR 
initiatives is that it provides employees with opportunities to actively engage with the 
community. Employees who are willing to help people in the community are likely to be 
cooperative toward peers (Fehrler and Przepiorka 2013). Therefore, from the firm’s 
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perspective, employees’ volunteering behavior can be an informative signal about their 
type, and thus has implications for management control in team environments.  
Team work has become increasingly common in organizational practice (Cohen 
and Bailey 1997). Teams can benefit organizations by enhancing information sharing, 
improving decision quality and increasing employee satisfaction (Wheelan 2014; Pizzini 
2010). However, the popularity of teams has created a control challenge for firm 
management, as employees working in teams often face the dilemma of whether to 
cooperate with others or free ride (Prendergast 1999). Prior research in management 
accounting has investigated the effects of different formal and informal control 
mechanisms on employees’ willingness to cooperate. While formal controls such as 
incentive contracts based on mutual monitoring are costly and often infeasible in practice, 
informal controls that rely on employees’ social motives have been shown to be effective 
in improving cooperation (Knez and Simester 2001; Hamilton et al. 2003; Kelly and Tan 
2010). I posit that employee volunteering programs can serve as an informal control 
mechanism by enabling employees to identify others’ type and, thereby, improve 
cooperation.  
Specifically, employees who participated in volunteering programs are likely to be 
conditional cooperators, who will cooperate if they expect that others will also cooperate 
(Dawes et al. 1977; Messick et al. 1983; Fischbacher et al. 2001). That is, while employee 
volunteers are more altruistic than non-volunteers, their final cooperation decision may 
depend on their expectations of whether others will cooperate. To form expectations about 
others, employees may focus on others’ volunteering behavior. Prior studies find that 
volunteering behavior is reflective of individuals’ propensity to act pro-socially. For 
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example, in the employee selection process, employers often believe that volunteers are 
more likely to become good organizational citizens (Organ 1988; Organ and Ryan 1995). 
Individuals who make charitable donations are perceived to be (and actually are) more 
trustworthy than those who do not make donations (Fehrler and Przepiorka 2013). I predict 
that employees who participated in volunteering programs are more willing to cooperate 
with others, but only when others also participated in volunteering programs, because 
employees use others’ volunteering as a signal of their type and react accordingly. I also 
predict that the extent to which employees rely on this signal in deciding whether to 
cooperate depends on the perceived credibility of the signal. Specifically, if it is possible 
that others may strategically send a favorable signal by volunteering, the credibility of the 
signal would be questionable. As a result, employees may be reluctant to trust the signal in 
making their cooperation decision.   
I conduct a two-stage experiment to test my predictions. In stage one, participants 
read a hypothetical case. They act as an employee of a company and choose between two 
options: to participate in a company-sponsored employee volunteering program that 
benefits people in the community, or to participate in an employee training session that 
potentially benefits themselves. In stage two, participants are randomly paired to play an 
incentivized one-shot prisoners’ dilemma game, where they decide whether to allocate high 
or low resources to a joint project. Participants’ resource allocation decision in stage two 
is the main dependent variable of interest. I use a 2 x 2 x 2 mixed experimental design, 
with two manipulated factors and a measured factor. I manipulate between-participants 
whether participants are aware of the stage-two task (i.e., resource allocation) before they 
make the stage-one decision (i.e., volunteering). If participants do not know about the 
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stage-two task when deciding whether to volunteer, the volunteering decision is likely to 
reveal their type (I refer to this condition as a non-strategic setting). By comparison, if 
participants know about the stage-two task when deciding whether to volunteer, the 
volunteering decision could be driven by a strategic motive (I refer to this condition as a 
strategic setting). I measure participants’ actual volunteering decision in stage one. I also 
manipulate within-participant whether the other whom the participant is paired with 
volunteered in stage one, by asking participants to indicate, respectively, whether they 
would allocate high or low resources if the other volunteered and if the other did not 
volunteer.  
Consistent with my predictions, I find that in non-strategic settings, cooperation 
rate is higher when the paired participants both participated in the volunteering program 
than otherwise. In strategic settings, however, cooperation rate does not differ significantly, 
regardless of whether one or both of the paired participants volunteered. Supplemental 
analysis suggests that participants are more likely to perceive others’ volunteering as an 
attempt to influence them in strategic settings than in non-strategic settings. Participants 
also are less likely to believe that others’ volunteering reveals their type in strategic settings 
than in non-strategic settings, and such beliefs influence participants’ cooperation 
decisions. These findings are consistent with my theory that the credibility of the signal of 
type is affected when volunteering could be used by others in a self-serving manner.  
This study has several implications for management accounting theory and 
practice. First, this study contributes to the management control literature by showing that 
employee volunteering programs can be used as an informal control mechanism to 
facilitate cooperation. The literature on cultural controls (e.g., Ouchi 1979; Van den Steen 
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2010a) suggests that firms can rely on organizational values to influence employees’ 
behavior. Consistent with this literature, the results of this study suggest that firms that 
value and promote employee volunteering can benefit from the spillover effects of 
volunteering programs on team controls. However, these benefits may only be realized 
when employees perceive others’ volunteering decisions as motivated by genuine pro-
sociality. In practice, it is often recommended that firms should regularly recognize 
employees for their volunteering behavior (Points of Light 2013). The findings of this study 
provide an important caveat for such practice: to the extent that public recognition makes 
employees volunteering highly visible, it might cast doubt on the perceived motives behind 
volunteering and, in turn, undermine the positive effect of volunteering on cooperation.  
 This study also provides new insights for the CSR literature. Empirical evidence 
on whether and how CSR activities affect firm value is still far from conclusive (Margolis 
et al. 2009). Although the positive correlation between CSR activities and firm value has 
been documented, it remains an open question whether CSR activities lead to strong 
financial performance or the reverse. This study contributes to the CSR literature by 
showing that investment in a specific type of CSR activities, company-sponsored employee 
volunteering programs, can create economic benefits by improving cooperative 
performance.     
The reminder of my dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews relevant 
literature. Chapter 3 discusses formal and informal control mechanisms and reviews the 
relevant literature. Chapter 3 provides theoretical background and develops testable 
hypotheses. Chapter 4 outlines the experimental method. Chapter 5 reports the results, and 
Chapter 6 offers concluding remarks.  
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CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW  
2.1 Cooperation Issues in Team Settings 
Teams have become increasingly common in organizational practice (Cohen and 
Bailey 1997). In a survey of senior executives, more than 80 percent of respondents believe 
that managing teams effectively is essential for their organizations to remain competitive 
(Ernst and Young 2013). The use of teams can enhance information sharing, improve 
decision quality, foster creativity and learning, and increase employee satisfaction 
(Wheelan 2014; Pizzini 2010). However, the increased popularity of teams also presents 
management control challenges for firms (Arya et al. 1997; Barron and Gjerde 1997), 
because the success of teams largely depends on whether employees are willing to 
cooperate with others to maximize the collective output. In team settings, employees may 
be compensated based on team outputs because individual contributions are not measurable 
(Holmstrom 1982). The use of group-based incentives may create a social dilemma for 
individual employees, in which the economically dominant strategy is to free ride 
(Prendergast 1999).  
The cooperation issues in team settings are widely studied in the economic 
literature, using either prisoners’ dilemma or public goods games. Empirical evidence 
suggests that a considerable portion of individuals free ride on others’ efforts or 
contributions in one-shot games, although not as frequently as the conventional economic 
theory predicts (Dawes and Thaler 1988). Economists have also investigated whether 
repeated interactions can improve cooperation. For infinitely repeated interactions, 
theoretical models predict that cooperation can be played in equilibrium under certain 
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circumstances (Bó 2005). However, infinitely repeated interaction is seldom feasible in 
practice. For finitely repeated interactions, game theory suggests that the defection 
equilibrium will be reached in every stage of the game as a result of backward induction. 
A robust empirical finding is that cooperation often declines over time in finitely repeated 
games (e.g., Kim and Walker 1984; Isaac et al. 1984; Issac et al. 1985).  
Because of the importance of teams for modern organizations and the prevalence 
of free-riding issues in team settings, researchers have investigated different types of 
management control mechanisms that can be used to mitigate free-riding and motivate 
more cooperation. Management control mechanisms are designed to limit the decision 
space of employees in order to encourage behaviors that will increase the probability of 
achieving the organization’s goals and discourage behaviors that will not (Birnberg and 
Snodgrass 1988). Merchant and Ven der Stede (2007) classify management control 
mechanisms based on the object of control, which can be the results produced (results or 
output control), the actions taken (action or behavior control), or the types of people 
employed and their shared norms and values (personnel and cultural control). The first two 
types of controls are often conceptualized formal control mechanisms (Jaworski 1988), 
because they rely on formal incentive contracting. In contrast, personnel and cultural 
controls are considered as informal controls as they rely on individuals’ social motives 
instead of formal contracting. In the next session, I first discuss how formal control 
mechanisms can affect employees’ economic motives to cooperate. I then discuss how both 
formal and informal control mechanisms can affect employees’ social motives to 
cooperate.  
2.2 Management Control Mechanisms 
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2.2.1 Formal Control Mechanisms and Economic Motives 
The first approach of formal control proposed by the agency literature is principal-
agent monitoring. Alchian and Demsetz (1972)’s model suggests that the principal can hire 
a third-party specialist to verify agents’ behaviors in team settings. In order to ensure 
incentive compatibility, the third-party specialist should receive the residual rewards of the 
team production. However, this principal-agent monitoring approach is often infeasible in 
practice. If third-party specialists can obtain verifiable information on individual agents’ 
effort levels, it is optimal for principals to contract on individual effort instead of team 
outputs.  
The second approach of formal control is mutual monitoring among agents. 
Compared to principals or third-party specialists, agents often have better information 
about team members’ effort levels. Because agents are compensated based on team outputs, 
they have incentives to monitor each other’s actions, allowing principals to extract private 
information (Holmstrom 1982). Two forms of peer monitoring are discussed in the 
literature: vertical monitoring and horizontal monitoring. Vertical peer monitoring relies 
on vertical communication from agents to the principal. Specifically, each agent observes 
others’ actions and reports their observations to the principal. Each agent’s compensation 
is contingent on others’ report of his/her actions (Ma 1988; Arya and Glover 1996). The 
effectiveness of vertical peer monitoring largely depends on whether agents will truthfully 
report their observations or form collusive agreements (Itoh 1993; Evans et al. 2006).  
Horizontal peer monitoring replies on team self-management and peer based 
control (Arya et al. 1997; Kandel and Lazear 1992; Prendergast 1999). Under horizontal 
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peer monitoring, principals design incentive systems that encourage agents to agree to take 
actions desired by the principal. The agreement among agents is enforced through formal 
sanctions, side contracting, or peer pressure. Essentially, horizontal peer monitoring relies 
on the coordination among agents, which requires agents to have access to ex post perfect 
information regarding others’ actions. Such requirement is rarely attainable, especially in 
modern organizations where teams are often geographically dispersed.    
2.2.2 Social Motives 
Whereas formal controls can affect employees’ economic incentives, they can also 
influence employees’ social motives in cooperative settings. In this section. I discuss 
different types of social motives to cooperate, such as altruism, norm compliance, 
reciprocity, group identity, and trust, and how both formal and informal controls can 
influence these social motives.  
Early research on social dilemmas uses altruism to explain cooperation, proposing 
that individuals engage in pro-social behaviors either because they derive utility from 
others’ well-beings (Becker 1974; Unger 1991) or because they derive utility from the act 
of pro-social behavior per se (Andreoni 1990). Experimental evidence from the economic 
and psychology literature suggests that a substantial portion of individuals choose to 
cooperate in social dilemmas out of kindness. For example, Baston and Moran (1999, 
2001) find that empathy-induced altruism reduced defection among female participants in 
one-shot prisoners’ dilemma. In repeated game settings, altruistic motives can help sustain 
cooperation overtime. For instance, Andreoni and Miller (1993) find that reputation 
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building in repeated prisoners’ dilemma is enhanced when participants believe that a large 
percentage of their opponents are altruistic.  
Research in social psychology suggests that when individuals are aware of what 
behaviors are appropriate and expected in the setting, they often have preferences to 
conform to such expectations (Bicchieri 2005). Tayler and Bloomfield (2011) provide 
experimental evidence that formal controls, in the form of probabilistic audits, increase 
cooperation in a public goods game setting. The presence of formal controls not only 
impacts employees’ sense of what behaviors are appropriate in the setting, but also 
increases employees’ tendency to conform to the behavior of their peers.  
Reciprocity plays an important role in cooperative settings. Reciprocity can be 
classified into two types: weak reciprocity and strong reciprocity. Weak reciprocity refers 
to individuals’ willingness to cooperate only when reciprocal strategies are profitable. In 
finitely repeated games, weak reciprocity allows for reputation building, which in turn 
enhances cooperative outcomes. Because observability of past cooperative behaviors is 
essential for reputation building, a control system that provides feedback regarding others’ 
actions can improve cooperation even if the feedback is not incorporated into formal 
contracting (Knez and Simester 2001; Kelly and Tan 2010). Strong reciprocity refers to 
individuals’ willingness to cooperate with others and punish non-cooperators, even when 
such behaviors are not in their self-interest. One-shot trust games are often used to measure 
strong reciprocity. In a meta-analysis of 84 trust games, Johnson and Mislin (2011) find 
that senders allocate 50 percent of their endowment to receivers while receivers on average 
return 30 percent of the available fund. Another evidence of strong reciprocity is the finding 
that individuals are often willing to incur a cost to punish non-cooperators, even when they 
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are not directly harmed by the non-cooperators (Fehr and Fischbacher 2004). Interestingly, 
De Quervain et al. (2004) provide neurological evidence that punishment of non-
cooperators in trust games lead to activation of the dorsal striatum, the part of brain that is 
associated with the processing of decision-related rewards (O’Doherty et al. 2004).   
The fundamental reason behind the cooperation issue in team settings is the conflict 
between individual and group incentives. If employees identify more with the group, they 
may internalize the group outcome to a greater degree and are more willing to cooperate to 
maximize the group outcome. Group identity is an individuals’ perception of 
belongingness to a social group (Turner et al. 1987). When group identity increases, 
individuals are less likely to draw distinctions between their own welfare and group 
members’ welfares (Kramer and Brewer 1984). As a result, individuals are more likely to 
make personal sacrifices for the benefits of the group. In addition, higher levels of group 
identity will increase employees’ expectations of other group members (Yamagishi and 
Kiyonari 2000). When employees expect others to cooperate, they are more likely to 
cooperate themselves as well (Dawes et al. 1977; Messick et al. 1983). In a cross-functional 
team setting, Rowe (2004) provide experimental evidence that properly designed 
accounting report structure and team structure can create a group frame, which helps to 
motivate cooperation. Towry (2003) find that group identity influences the effectiveness 
of mutual monitoring contracts. In teams with high level of group identity, employees are 
more able to coordinate with each other, increasing the effectiveness of horizontal mutual 
monitoring. In contrast, vertical mutual monitoring becomes less effective as employees 
are more able to collude with each other when they share a high level of group identity. In 
a recent study, Chen et al. (2017) find that mission-driven organizations can use a below-
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market pay to attract employees who share the same values and missions with the 
organization. These employees are more willing to cooperate with each other, as they 
perceive their team members as value congruent and expect their team members to 
contribute to the social mission.  
Trust is another important social motive underlying cooperation. The most common 
definitions of trust involve two components: the willingness to be vulnerable to the actions 
of another party and the positive expectation of another party’s intentions or behaviors 
(Mayer et al. 1995; Rousseau et al. 1998). In cooperative settings, individuals always face 
some level of relational risk, which is the risk that other group member fail to live up to 
expectations with regards to effort or cooperation (Das and Teng 1996, 2001). Therefore, 
the willingness to be vulnerable or to take risk is a prerequisite for individuals to trust others 
in cooperative settings. The positive expectation of another party’s intentions or behaviors 
provide individuals with reasons to engage in cooperative behaviors. Researchers have 
identified three antecedents of trust, or characteristics of the trustee: ability, benevolence, 
and integrity (Mayer et al. 1995; Colquitt et al. 2007). Specifically, ability refers to the 
trustee’s knowledge and skills needed to succeed in the cooperative settings. Benevolence 
refers to the extent to which the trustee is perceived to want to do good to the trustor, 
independent of any egocentric profit motive. Integrity refers to the extent to which the 
trustee is perceived to adhere to moral and ethical principles that are acceptable by the 
trustor. Management control mechanisms can influence employees’ propensity to trust and 
cooperate through their impacts on these three antecedents of trust.  
The extant literature provides mixed evidence on whether the use of management 
control mechanisms will increase or decrease trust. The implementation of formal control 
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mechanisms can signal distrust from the principal, or the controlling party, which decreases 
agents’ willingness to cooperate with the principal (Falk and Kosfeld 2006, Christ 2013). 
In addition, Malhotra and Murnighan (2002) find that when formal controls are present, 
employees attribute cooperation to the constraints imposed by the control. Therefore, the 
implementation of formal control inhibits the development of trust. However, Coletti et al. 
(2005) argue that this result does not account for the increased cooperation resulted from 
the economic incentives inherent in formal controls. They provide experimental evidence 
that when employees observe the increased level of cooperation induced by formal controls, 
they attribute the cooperation to their partners’ innate trustworthiness instead of the 
presence of control. The control-induced trust has a positive impact on the subsequent level 
of cooperation, even after formal controls are removed. In a trust game setting, Garrett et 
al. (2015) replicate the finding that the presence of formal controls increase trust.  
In sum, both economic and social motives affect employees’ willingness to 
cooperate in team settings. Whereas formal controls can be effective in motivating 
desirable behaviors, they are often costly or infeasible to implement, especially in team 
settings where it is difficult to precisely monitor and measure individual inputs. Therefore, 
control mechanisms that rely on employees’ social motives can be an alternative way to 
solve the cooperation issue in team settings. In this study, I am particularly interested in 
how employee volunteering programs, a specific type of CSR initiatives, can serve as an 
informal control mechanism. In the next section, I will review the CSR literature generally 
and employee volunteering programs specifically.  
2.3 Employee Volunteering Programs 
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2.3.1 Benefits of CSR 
In this study, I follow the approach of Fitch (1976) and Hales et al. (2016) and 
define CSR as any corporate action that benefits society by either generating a positive 
externality or mitigating a negative externality.1 This definition is broad as it does not 
require CSR activities to be altruistic or go beyond the firm’s current economic and legal 
requirements.   
Over the past decades, firms have devoted considerable amounts of resources to 
CSR. A recent survey estimates that Fortune 500 firms in the US and UK spent $15.2 
billion on CSR in 2014 (The Economist 2015). Over 90 percent of Global Fortune 250 
(G250) companies now publish CSR reports annually (KPMG 2015). One explanation for 
the growth in CSR is that CSR activities can be profitable for firms. First, empirical 
evidence suggests that CSR can help firms differentiate their products from their 
competitors (Navarro 1988; Sprinkle and Maines 2010) and enhance customer loyalty (Sen 
and Bhattacharya 2001). In addition, customers are willing to pay a higher price for 
responsibly produced goods (Eichholtz et al. 2010). Second, CSR can help firms reduce 
information asymmetry in the hiring process and create better employer-employee matches 
(Brekke and Nyborg 2004). CSR may also reduce the labor costs as employees are willing 
to accept lower wages from socially responsible employers (Burbano 2016). The benefits 
of CSR in labor markets also pertain to existing employees, as investments in CSR can 
motivates higher employee efforts (Balakrishnan et al. 2011, Douthit et al. 2017). Third, 
certain types of CSR activities can be used as a risk management tool. Empirical evidence 
                                                 
1 Externality is defined as either a benefit or a cost borne by stakeholders who did not choose to receive the 
benefit or incur the cost (Buchanan and Stubblebine 1962).  
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suggest that following negative firm events, stakeholders react less negatively if the focal 
firm invested before in CSR activities that benefit society (Richardson et al. 1999; Godfrey 
et al. 2009). Forth, recent evidence suggests that investors incorporate CSR information 
into their investment decisions and require a lower cost of equity capital for firms that have 
strong CSR performance (Dhaliwal et al. 2011). Despite the many potential ways in which 
firms can benefit from CSR investments, the empirical evidence on the relationship 
between CSR activities and firm value is still inconclusive. In a meta-analysis, Margolis et 
al. (2009) find that only 28 percent of the 251 studies they examine report a positive 
correlation between CSR activities and corporate financial performance. In addition, many 
archival studies reported by Margolis et al. (2009) do not provide clear causality between 
CSR activities and financial performance. This is consistent with a recent finding that 
strong financial performance can lead to increase in future CSR investments (Lys et al. 
2015).  
As CSR is a broad concept, firms can engage in CSR in many different ways. For 
example, firms can invest in projects that reduce their carbon footprints (De Roeck and 
Delobbe 2012), promote ethical labor practices (DeTienne and Lewis 2005), sponsor 
community events (Lii and Lee 2012), or make charitable donations (Lev et al. 2010). In 
this study, I focus on a specific type of CSR initiative, employee volunteering programs.  
2.3.2 Employee Volunteering Programs 
Employee volunteering programs are initiatives sponsored by firm management 
that provide resources, time, leadership, and social encouragement in order for employees 
to volunteer in the local community (Knox 2016). Rodell et al. (2016) define employee 
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volunteering as “employed individuals giving time during a planned activity for an external 
nonprofit or charitable group or organization” (p. 57). Common elements of employee 
volunteering programs include providing employees with time-based support and/or 
financial and logistical support. Time-based support involves giving employees paid time 
off to volunteer or allowing employees to adjust their work schedules to accommodate 
volunteering (Basil et al. 2009). Financial and logistical support refers to the monetary and 
physical assets that a company donates to support employee volunteering. Common 
practices include allowing employees to use company facilities, equipment, or 
transportation (Basil et al. 2009; Booth et al; 2009), matching employees’ volunteer hours 
with monetary or product donations (Jones 2010), and providing financial support, such as 
paying entry fees or reimbursing costs for employee volunteering (Booth et al. 2009). 
Volunteering programs have become a mainstream CSR practice in the corporate 
world. Survey evidence suggests that over 90 percent of Fortune 500 companies have 
employee volunteering programs that encourage and subsidize employees to perform 
community services (Boccalandro 2009), and the number of firms that adopt employee 
volunteering programs has been increasing (Deloitte 2010). In fact, corporate volunteering 
programs are believed to be “one of the fastest growing areas of voluntary activity” in 
Europe and North America (Bussell and Forbes 2008, 364).  
Volunteering activities are, by definition, uncompensated and do not directly 
generate profits for firms. As discussed in Section 2.3.1, CSR activities have several 
benefits for firms, including enhancing firm image among customers and investors 
(Navarro 1988), mitigating stakeholders’ reactions to negative firm events (Richardson et 
al. 1999; Godfrey et al. 2009), and lowering the cost of equity capital (Dhaliwal et al. 2011). 
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As a specific type of CSR activities, employee volunteering programs may also benefit 
firms in the above ways. However, the defining characteristic that differentiates 
volunteering programs from other types of CSR activities is the opportunities they provide 
for employees to have direct social interactions with others in the community. Employee 
volunteering programs are typically led by the grassroot efforts of employees (Grant 2012). 
A recent survey of U.S. companies suggests that 62 percent of volunteering programs are 
directed by employees, of which 15 percent are solely driven by employees (Wainwright 
2005). Therefore, the major benefits of volunteering programs for firms are their positive 
impacts on employee attitudes and performance.  
Employee volunteering programs can improve current employees’ performance for 
several reasons. First, research on volunteering outside the field of management suggests 
that individuals often obtain a sense of accomplishment and a sense of belonging from 
volunteering experience (Mojza et al. 2011; Caligiuri et al. 2013). To the extent that 
employees appreciate the volunteering opportunities, company-sponsored volunteering 
programs will be viewed by some employees as a type of employee benefit and, therefore, 
will be reciprocated with higher level of work effort (Booth et al. 2009). Second, because 
volunteering programs often leverage employees’ skills, they provide opportunities for 
professional and leadership skills development (Wainwright 2005). Third, volunteering 
programs can strengthen employees’ identification with their organizations (Jones 2010; 
Rodell et al. 2017) and increase employee engagement (Caligiuri et al. 2013). Research in 
organizational behavior has documented a robust positive relationship between employee 
engagement and performance, at both individual and business-unit level (see Judge et al. 
2001 and Harter et al. 2002 for meta-analyses). Therefore, volunteering programs should 
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lead to improved firm performance through increased employee satisfaction and 
engagement. Consistent with this argument, Knox (2016) find that the number of 
volunteering hours disclosed in firms’ sustainability reports is positively correlated with 
employees’ future productivity, potentially due to the positive effects of volunteering 
programs on employees’ loyalty and skill level.  
Employee volunteering programs also can help firms attract and retain talents. A 
survey finds that about 70 percent of the surveyed Millennials believe that firms should use 
employee volunteering programs as a professional development tool and 62 percent prefer 
working in firms with such programs (Deloitte 2007). Using both laboratory and field data, 
Jones et al. (2014) find that companies can use employee volunteering programs to 
distinguish themselves from other potential employers. Employees who volunteer through 
company-sponsored programs report higher levels of commitment to their organizations 
and increased intention to stay at the job (Peterson 2004).  
Taken together, the extant literature suggests that employee volunteering programs 
positively influence employees’ behaviors in the workplace. The current study extends this 
literature by investigating another benefit that employee volunteering programs may bring 
to the firm: that is, signaling employees’ pro-sociality and improving the overall 
cooperative performance in team settings. In this study, I focus on employee volunteering 
programs, rather than other types of CSR initiatives such as charitable contributions, for 
two reasons.  
First, compared to monetary donations, volunteering is considered a more public 
form of contribution (Lee et al. 1999) and, therefore, is more likely to be observed and used 
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by others in the firm as a signal. Second, by definition, volunteering involves giving time. 
The contribution of time represents more active involvement and more direct social 
interactions with others in the community than the contribution of money. Recent studies 
in marketing and psychology suggest that individuals perceive the contribution of time and 
money differently. When opportunity costs are held constant, individuals perceive the 
contribution of time to be more moral and self-expressive than the contribution of money, 
especially for individuals whose self-concepts are more organized around their moral 
beliefs (Reed et al. 2007). Liu and Aaker (2008) find that asking individuals to consider 
the amount of time (vs. money) they are willing to donate to charities lead to higher levels 
of actual donations, as the concept of time activates a more emotional mindset which 
ultimately leads to other-focused behaviors. Therefore, participation in volunteering 
programs is more likely to serve as an informative signal of employees’ pro-sociality in 
cooperative settings.    
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CHAPTER 3. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
3.1 The Signaling Value of Volunteering 
In this study, I use a one-shot prisoners’ dilemma experiment to examine how 
employees’ cooperation is influenced by volunteering behavior. When facing social 
dilemmas, individuals have different behavioral dispositions toward whether to cooperate 
or free ride (Kurzban and Houser 2005, Rustagi et al. 2010). The literature on volunteering 
has identified prosocial personality (Penner et al. 1995), a two-dimensional construct 
consists of other-oriented empathy (i.e., individuals’ pro-social thoughts and feelings) and 
helpfulness (i.e., individuals’ behavioral tendency to help), as an important individual-level 
antecedent of volunteering intensity and persistence2 (Penner 2002; Finkelstein 2009). 
Research on motives for volunteering theorizes that there are two types of motives: self-
oriented and other-oriented (Musick and Wilson 2007). Self-oriented motives are 
concerned with potential positive outcomes for volunteers, such as increased positive affect 
and self-esteem, acquisition of new knowledge and skills, advancement in one’s career, 
and maintenance of social relationships (Clary et al. 1998). In contrast, other-oriented 
motives focus on improving the well-being of others. This is consistent with outcome-
based social preferences models, which suggest that volunteers derive utilities from both 
an improvement of others’ well-being (Becker 1974; Unger 1991) and the act of helping 
per se (Andreoni 1990). Empirical evidence suggests that other-oriented motives are a 
significant predictor of volunteering intensity in both the general adult population (Penner 
                                                 
2 Volunteering intensity captures the frequency with which an individual volunteers while volunteering 
persistence captures the longevity of an individual’s volunteering activity. For a review of common measures 
of each construct, see Rodell et al (2016). 
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and Finkelstein 1998) and employees (Brockner et al. 2014), while self-oriented motives 
have little impact on volunteering (Penner and Finkelstein 1998; Carlo et al. 2005). 
Taken together, the above discussion suggests that volunteers are likely to be more 
pro-social than non-volunteers. Therefore, in social exchanges, volunteers are less likely 
to maximize their own economic interests, but are more likely to act cooperatively, than 
non-volunteers. Consistent with this argument, Fehrler and Przepiorka (2013) find that, in 
a trust game setting, second-movers who made charitable donations send back larger 
proportions of the investment returns to first-movers. Therefore, compared to employees 
who chose not to volunteer, employees who self-selected into volunteering programs are 
more likely to act pro-socially in social dilemmas.  
         While volunteers may be more altruistic in general (Carpenter and Myers 2010), 
altruism is unlikely to be the main driving force of cooperative behavior in social dilemmas 
(Palfrey and Prisbrey 1997). In team settings, the collective output depends on employees’ 
joint actions. Individual employees’ unilateral altruistic behavior may not be able to 
achieve the cooperative outcome, and may actually make them worse off, if others exploit 
their altruism (Yamagishi and Sato 1986). Therefore, even employees who are willing to 
pursue the cooperative outcome may need to protect themselves from others’ opportunistic 
behavior (Dawes and Thaler 1988). In the public-goods game literature, there is robust 
empirical evidence that the majority of individuals can be classified as either conditional 
cooperators who will contribute if they expect others to contribute, or free riders who never 
contribute (Gachter 2006). For example, in Fischbacher and Gachter (2010)’s experiment, 
about 55 percent of the participants are conditional cooperators and 23 percent are free 
riders. The remaining percentage of participants either are unclassifiable (about 10 percent) 
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or exhibit a more complex behavioral pattern (e.g., about 12 percent of participants 
contribute up to a certain point and then start to reduce contribution as others contribute 
more). Such a distribution of different types of individuals is replicated across several 
laboratory studies (Chaudhuri 2011), suggesting that even individuals who are more pro-
social are unlikely to cooperate unconditionally in social dilemmas.  
Both conditional cooperators and free riders may defect in social dilemmas, but 
they often do so for different reasons. For conditional cooperators, expectations about 
others’ behavior have important impacts on their willingness to cooperate (Dawes et al. 
1977; Messick et al. 1983). If they expect others to not cooperate, they will also not 
cooperate, out of concerns about being taken advantage of (Poppe et al. 1986; Ahn et al. 
2001). For free riders, expectations about others’ behavior is less important because they 
always tend to act in an economically rational way. That is, free riders will defect in social 
dilemmas out of greed instead of fear (Ahn et al. 2001). 
Based on the above discussion, I expect that employee volunteers are less likely to 
be free riders – that is, more likely to be conditional cooperators – than non-volunteers. As 
conditional cooperators, employee volunteers’ final decision of whether to cooperate 
depends on whether they expect others to cooperate. Research in economics suggests that 
mechanisms that allow conditional cooperators to identify and monitor each other help 
sustain cooperation (Rustagi et al. 2010), and others’ volunteering behavior can serve as 
such a mechanism. In the labor market, volunteering experience is often interpreted as a 
positive signal about potential employees’ pro-social attributes (Katz and Rosenberg 2005; 
Handy et al. 2010). Firms believe that volunteers are more likely to be good organizational 
citizens who are willing to incur personal costs to engage in extra-role behaviors to help 
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the organization and colleagues (Organ 1988; Organ and Ryan 1995). Individuals who 
voluntarily engage in other forms of pro-social activities, such as making donations to 
charities, are also perceived as more trustworthy than those who choose not to engage in 
these activities (Albert et al. 2007; Fehrler and Przepiorka 2013). 
Others’ trustworthiness is important for conditional cooperators to make 
cooperation decisions because they are concerned about the relational risk of being 
exploited (Kerr 1983). Individuals who desire cooperation often seek justification for 
trusting others (Weber et al. 2004), and others’ volunteering experience provides such 
justification by serving as a signal of their type. However, the extent to which employees 
rely on this signal in making cooperation decisions will likely depend on the perceived 
motive behind others’ volunteering. I first consider settings where others’ volunteering 
behavior is perceived as non-strategic. That is, employees believe that others’ volunteering 
decision is a genuine reflection of their pro-social attributes. In these settings, I expect that 
employee volunteers will be more cooperative when they work with other volunteers. By 
comparison, non-volunteers are more likely to be free riders, whose cooperation decisions 
are unaffected by others’ behavior. Taken together, this leads to the following hypothesis: 
H1: In non-strategic settings, the cooperation rate is higher when employees and their 
partners both chose to participate in volunteering programs than otherwise.  
 
In a recent study, Chen et al. (2017) find that mission-driven organizations can use 
a below-market pay to attract employees whose personal values are congruent with the 
organizational mission. Specifically, they find that below-market pay increases team 
cooperation, regardless of whether the team-based task contributes to the organization’s 
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social mission. The current study differs from Chen et al. (2017) in two ways. First, Chen 
et al. (2017) focus on the role of compensation contracts in employee selection, while the 
current study focuses on employees’ behaviors under a given compensation contract. 
Second, participants in Chen et al. (2017) are always paired with team members who 
selected the same contract. Therefore, their findings do not speak to how pro-social 
employees would behave when they are paired with team members who are less pro-social.   
3.2 Strategic Considerations 
Now I consider settings where participation in volunteering programs may not be 
truly reflective of individuals’ pro-sociality. Prior research on signaling suggests that 
individuals without the desirable attributes tend to mimic those who have these attributes, 
if the cost of mimicking does not exceed its benefits (Vesterlund 2003). If employees 
expect others to observe and draw inferences from their volunteering behavior, they will 
have extrinsic motives to volunteer even if they do not genuinely value volunteering. 
Consistent with the above arguments, in a cross-country survey, Handy et al. (2010) find 
that in countries where volunteering is viewed more positively (such as the United States 
and Canada), undergraduate students volunteer more frequently in order to build their 
resume.3 
In practice, there are many factors that can affect the observability of employees’ 
volunteering decisions to team members. For example, a recent survey finds that slightly 
more than half of the participating firms have some forms of employee volunteer 
                                                 
3 Prior studies suggest that impression concerns are another reason that some individuals volunteer (Linardi 
and McConnell 2008, Carpenter and Myers 2010). In this study, I focus on employees’ strategic 
consideration, rather than pure impression concerns. As discussed in the Methodology section, the 
experiment is designed such that impression concerns are not likely to be salient to participants.   
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recognition as part of their volunteering programs (Committee Encouraging Corporate 
Philanthropy 2014). Employee volunteer recognition is often recommended by 
practitioners as a best practice to encourage employee volunteering and ranges from giving 
thank-you notes to large-scale organization-wide award ceremonies (Point of Lights 2013). 
These recognition programs make it salient to employees that others can observe their 
volunteering behavior and potentially infer their type. Therefore, in firms that regularly 
recognize employee volunteers, employees who do not genuinely value volunteering may 
nonetheless volunteer, in order to show to colleagues that they are pro-social and 
cooperative.  
Another factor that can affect the observability of employees’ volunteering 
behavior and provide employees with extrinsic motives to volunteer is whether their job 
responsibilities require regular and predictable cooperation with others. Teams vary in their 
structure and composition. For example, functional teams are typically composed of 
employees from the same department and meet regularly (Rowe 2004). In these teams, 
employees are likely to anticipate frequent interactions with other team members, and thus 
have more incentives to volunteer strategically in order to be perceived as pro-social. In 
contrast, cross-functional teams are more temporary in nature. Employees in these teams 
interact less frequently with other team members and, therefore, may be less motivated to 
signal their pro-sociality.  
For my purpose, if employees make the volunteering decision strategically, the 
volunteering decision will become less diagnostic about their pro-sociality, and employees 
will have difficulty identifying peers who are genuinely trustworthy. Therefore, in settings 
where a strategic motive may underlie the volunteering decision, volunteering is a less 
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informative signal of type and, as a result, is less effective in facilitating cooperation. This 
leads to the following hypothesis:  
H2: Compared to non-strategic settings, the cooperation rate in strategic settings is 
affected to a lesser extent by whether employees and their partners participated in 
volunteering programs.  
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CHAPTER 4. METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Experimental Task and Design 
 
I design a two-stage experiment to test my hypotheses. In stage one, participants 
complete an individual task. In this task, participants assume the role of an employee of a 
company who is offered the opportunity to take paid time off and volunteer at a local 
nonprofit organization. Participants are asked to choose between two options: participating 
in the volunteering program, or participating in an employee training session (see the case 
materials in Appendix A). The case materials suggest that the volunteering program will 
benefit people in the community and the training session will potentially improve 
employees’ own job-related skills. In stage two, participants are randomly paired, and each 
pair plays an incentivized one-shot prisoners’ dilemma game in an organizational context: 
they are endowed with private resources and are asked to decide whether they will allocate 
high or low resources to a joint project (see the case materials in Appendix B). Cooperative 
outcome will obtain if both participants in the pair contribute high resources to the joint 
project, but each participant has an economic incentive to defect by allocating low 
resources to the joint project. Figure 1 presents the payoff table for the stage-two task.  
It is important to note that participants’ volunteering decision in stage one is 
hypothetical and does not affect their experimental earnings. I made this design choice for 
two reasons. First, as discussed in section 2.3.2, the contribution of time and the 
contribution of money activate different types of mindsets and are perceived differently by 
observers. If the stage one volunteering decision affects participants’ income, they may 
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perceive the volunteering behavior as a contribution of money instead of a contribution of 
time. Second, a recent study find that employees who work for CSR firms are likely to 
engage in moral licensing and shirk on their primary job duty (List and Momeni 2017). Not 
linking volunteering decisions to experimental earnings minimizes the possibility of moral 
licensing in my setting.    
(Player 1, Player 2)  Player  2 
  High resource Low resource 
Player 1 
High resource (1500, 1500)  (1000, 2000) 
Low resource (2000, 1000) (1200, 1200) 
Figure 1: Payoff Table for the Stage-Two Task 
I used a 2 x 2 x 2 mixed experimental design, with two manipulated factors and one 
measured factor. First, I manipulated between-participants whether participants are aware 
of the stage-two task before they make stage-one decisions (Yes versus No). This 
manipulation resulted in two conditions: Strategic (i.e., participants know about the stage-
two task when deciding whether to volunteer) versus Non-Strategic (i.e., participants do 
not know about the stage-two task when deciding whether to volunteer). Second, I 
measured participants’ actual decision of whether to participate in the volunteering 
program (Yes versus No). Third, I used the strategy method to manipulate within-
participant whether the other person whom the participant is paired with decided to 
volunteer (Yes versus No). Specifically, I asked participants to indicate, respectively, 
whether they would allocate high or low resources to the joint project if the other person 
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chose to participate in the volunteering program and if the other person chose not to 
participate in the volunteering program. Then, depending on the other’s actual volunteering 
decision, one of the two allocation choices was used to determine the participant’s earnings. 
The main purpose of using the strategy method was to ensure that there are sufficient 
observations for the case where the other volunteered and the case where the other did not 
volunteer.4     
It is worth noting that the volunteering decision in the Strategic condition is 
different from pre-game communication, which has been shown to increase cooperation 
(see Ledyard 1994 and Chaudhuri 2011 for reviews). Pre-game communication can be 
either free-form or restricted-form. Regardless of the communication format, it gives 
individuals an opportunity to make promises to cooperate or exert high level of effort.5 
Whereas the communication is non-enforceable and represents cheap talk in a game-
theoretical sense, it still may increase cooperation or effort because it activates the social 
norm of promise-keeping. Individuals may experience guilt if they fail to keep their 
promises and violate others’ expectations (Vanberg 2008). However, the volunteering 
decision in my strategic setting does not involve promises. Whereas employees may 
strategically choose to participate in volunteering programs with the hope of influencing 
others’ beliefs about their type, they do not explicitly commit to anything. Therefore, 
employees will be less likely to experience guilt if they later defect. 
4.2 Participants and Experimental Procedures 
                                                 
4 Prior research suggests that decisions elicited by the strategy method are similar to decisions elicited by the 
direct-response method (Cason and Mui 1998, Brandts and Charness 2000, Oxoby and McLeish 2004). 
5 For example, in Evans et al. (2016), managers make nonbinding collusive agreements via instant messaging. 
In Douthit et al. (2012) and Arnold and Grasser (2017), agents promise certain levels of effort in a principal-
agent setting.  
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Seventy-eight undergraduate business students at a public university in the U.S. 
participated in the experiment. Seven experimental sessions were conducted, and the 
number of participants in each session ranged from eight to fourteen. Participants’ average 
age was 20.8 years and 47 percent were male. The experiment task was computerized using 
the z-Tree software (Fischbacher 2007).  
Upon arrival at the laboratory, participants were seated at a computer terminal and 
gave their informed consent. At the beginning of the study, participants in all conditions 
were informed that the study consisted of two parts and were given stage-one instructions 
(i.e., volunteering decisions). Afterwards, in Non-Strategic conditions, participants decided 
whether they would like to participate in the volunteering program and explained the 
reasons behind their choices. Then, they proceeded to stage two (i.e., resource-allocation 
decisions). After reading stage-two instructions, participants answered a quiz to ensure that 
they fully understood the instructions and were not able to proceed until all questions were 
answered correctly. Next, participants were randomly paired and made allocation decisions 
in the prisoners’ dilemma game.  
Experimental procedures for Strategic conditions are different in terms of when 
participants were given stage-two instructions. Specifically, after reading stage-one 
instructions, participants in Strategic conditions were immediately given stage-two 
instructions. Then, they answered the quiz related to stage-two instructions and were not 
able to proceed until all questions were answered correctly. After passing the quiz, 
participants decided whether they would like to participate in the volunteering program 
and explained the reasons behind their choices. Then, they were randomly paired and made 
allocation decisions in the prisoners’ dilemma game.  
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In all conditions, after the two stages were completed, participants answered a post-
experimental questionnaire. Then, participants were paid in cash (a five-dollar participation 
fee plus experimental earnings) and dismissed.6 The average participant payoff was $10. 
The timelines of Strategic and Non-strategic conditions are depicted in Figure 2.  
                                                 
6 Whereas it is possible that participants might indirectly infer their partners’ volunteering decision based on 
their payoffs at the end of the session, they are never explicitly informed of their partners’ decisions. I made 
this design choice to minimize the possibility that participants in the Non-Strategic conditions will choose to 
volunteer out of impression concerns.     
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Figure 2: Timelines of the Strategic and Non-Strategic conditions 
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CHAPTER 5. RESULTS 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for all experimental conditions. The 
dependent variable is the binary choice of whether participants cooperated in the prisoners’ 
dilemma game, which is coded as one if a participant contributed high resources and zero 
otherwise, labeled Cooperation. I have three main independent variables: (1) a dummy 
variable which equals one for Strategic conditions and zero for Non-strategic conditions, 
labeled Strategic, (2) a dummy variable which equals one if the participant chose to 
volunteer in stage one and zero otherwise, labeled OwnVolunteer, and (3) a dummy 
variable which equals one if the other person whom the participant is paired with chose to 
volunteer in stage one and zero otherwise, labeled OtherVolunteer.  




































































N = 11 
 
Notes: 
1. Cooperation equals to one if the participant contributed high resources to the joint project and zero 
otherwise. 
2. OwnVolunteer equals to one if the participant chose to volunteer in stage one and zero otherwise. 
3. OtherVolunteer equals to one if the other person whom the participant is paired with chose to volunteer 
in stage one and zero otherwise. 
4. The cell entries are the percentage of participants who choose to cooperate and the number of 
observations in each condition. 
5. The number of participants in Non-strategic and Strategic conditions are 34 and 44, respectively. Each 
participant makes two resource allocation decisions, depending on whether the other person chose to 
participate in the volunteering program or not. 
 
5.2 Hypotheses Tests 
H1 predicts that, in non-strategic settings, the cooperation rate will be higher when 
both participants in the pair chose to volunteer in stage one than otherwise, and H2 predicts 
that this effect will be weaker in strategic settings. Because H1 and H2 jointly predict an 
ordinal interaction effect, I first test an overall contrast model across Non-strategic and 
Strategic conditions (Buckless and Ravenscroft 1990). This contrast model uses the 
weights of +6 for the Non-strategic condition where the two paired participants both 
volunteered, 0 for the Strategic condition where the two paired participants both 
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volunteered, and -1 for the other six conditions.7  As reported in Panel A of Table 2, 
consistent with my predictions, this contrast model is statistically significant (p = 0.001, 
one-tailed).8   
Then, I conduct separate tests to examine the effect of volunteering on cooperation 
in Non-strategic conditions and Strategic conditions, respectively. In Non-strategic 
conditions, H1 predicts an interactive effect between OwnVolunteer and OtherVolunteer 
on Cooperation. I conduct a contrast analysis using the weights of +3 for the condition 
where the two paired participants both volunteered and -1 for the other three conditions. 
As reported in Panel B of Table 2, this contrast model is statistically significant (p = 0.002, 
one-tailed).9 I also regress Cooperation on an indicator variable that equals one if the two 
paired participants both volunteered and zero otherwise, controlling for repeated measures. 
The indicator variable is statistically significant (p = 0.003, one-tailed), suggesting that 
Cooperation is significantly higher when both participants chose to volunteer in stage one 
than otherwise. As reported in Panel A of Table 2, follow-up simple effect tests reveal that 
Cooperation is significantly higher when both participants chose to volunteer in stage one 
than when only the focal participant chose to volunteer in stage one (p = 0.003, one-tailed), 
when only the other chose to volunteer in stage one (p = 0.093, one-tailed), or when neither 
chose to volunteer in stage one (p = 0.004, one-tailed). These results provide support for 
H1. 
 
                                                 
7 I assigned a zero weight to the Strategic condition where the two paired participants both volunteered, 
because I did not make a specific prediction as to whether Cooperation will be higher in this condition than 
in the other three Strategic conditions. 
8 The residual between-condition variation not captured by the contrast model is non-significant (p = 0.883), 
indicating that the contrast model provides a good explanation for the experimental results. 
9 The residual between-condition variation not captured by the contrast model is non-significant (p = 0.755), 
indicating that the contrast model provides a good explanation for the experimental results. 
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Table 2 – Results of Hypotheses Tests 
Panel A: Omnibus contrast analysis (Dependent variable = Cooperation) a 
 
 SS df MS F-stat p-value 
(one-tailed) 
The overall interaction effect 2.424 
 
1 2.424 10.305 0.001 
Error 34.811 148 0.235   
 
Panel B: Contrast Analysis for H1 in Non-strategic conditions (Dependent variable = 
Cooperation b 
 
 SS df MS F-stat p-value 
(one-tailed) 
The predicted interaction effect 1.996 
 
1 1.996 8.881 0.002 
Error 14.386 64 0.225   
 
Simple-effects Tests 
[Self: Volunteer; Other: Volunteer] > [Self: 
Volunteer; Other: Non-volunteer] 
 8.190 0.003 
 
[Self: Volunteer; Other: Volunteer] > [Self: Non-
volunteer; Other: Volunteer] 
 1.784 0.093 
 
[Self: Volunteer; Other: Volunteer] > [Self: Non-
volunteer; Other: Non-volunteer] 
 7.868 0.004 
 
Panel C: ANOVA for H2 in Strategic conditions (Dependent variable = Cooperation) 
 
Source SS df MS F-stat p-value 
(two-tailed) 
OwnVolunteer 0.095 1 0.095 0.367 0.548 
OtherVolunteer 0.640 1 0.640 2.808 0.101 




a. The contrast analysis of the overall interaction effect uses the code +6 for the Non-strategic condition 
where the two paired participants both volunteered, 0 for the Strategic condition where the two paired 
participants both volunteered, and -1 for the other six conditions.  
b. The contrast analysis of the predicted interaction effect uses the code +3 for the Non-strategic condition 
where the two paired participants both volunteered, and -1 for the other three Non-strategic conditions.  
See Table 1 for the definitions of other variables. 
In Strategic conditions, I conduct an ANOVA, with Cooperation as the dependent 
measure, OwnVolunteer, OtherVolunteer and their interaction as the independent measures. 
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As reported in Panel C of Table 2, the main effects of OwnVolunteer (p = 0.548, two-tailed) 
and OtherVolunteer (p = 0.101, two-tailed), and the interaction term (p = 0.898, two-tailed), 
are non-significant. These results show that, consistent with H2, in settings where a 
strategic motive may underlie the volunteering decisions, volunteering no longer facilitates 
cooperation.  
My theory suggests that, in Strategic conditions, individuals who do not genuinely 
care about volunteering may nonetheless volunteer out of strategic consideration. 
Consistent with this reasoning, a logit regression finds that participants in Strategic 
conditions are more likely to participate in the volunteering program than those in Non-
Strategic conditions (p = 0.082, one-tailed). However, despite the increased participation 
in the volunteering program, as the perceived motive underlying volunteering becomes 
unclear in Strategic conditions, participants are less likely to rely on others’ volunteering 
behavior in deciding whether to cooperate. As expected, I find that, when both participants 
chose to volunteer in stage one, Cooperation is lower (p = 0.09, one-tailed) in Strategic 
conditions (0.55) than in Non-Strategic conditions (0.77). Taken together, these results 
provide support for H2.  
5.3 Supplemental Analyses 
To further understand participants’ decision processes, I conduct a series of 
supplemental analyses. As reported in Table 3, in the post-experimental questionnaire, I 
ask participants to indicate the extent to which they agree with the following statements, “I 
think the other participant made the volunteering decision in task 1 with the purpose of 
influencing me in task 2,” and “I made the volunteering decision in task 1 with the purpose 
of influencing the other participant in task 2,” on a Likert scale ranging from 1 (Strongly 
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Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree). Participants’ average responses to these two questions are 
both significantly higher in Strategic conditions than in Non-Strategic conditions (p values 
< 0.003, two-tailed), indicating that participants in Strategic conditions understand the 
potential strategic motive behind the volunteering decision.  
Table 3 – Process Measures 
 Non-Strategic Conditions Strategic Conditions 
Volunteers 
 












(N = 11 ) 
Mean (s.d.) 
Influence me a 2.95 (1.68) 2.92 (1.44) 4.42 (1.73) 3.64 (1.36) 
Influence the other b 1.82 (1.22) 2.25 (1.36) 3.73 (2.18) 2.82 (2.23) 
Belief c 4.50 (1.68) 5.36 (1.92) 4.82 (1.74) 3.91 (1.92) 
General tendency to trust d 5.86 (1.21) 4.58 (1.88) 5.00 (1.75) 5.00 (2.41) 




All responses are made on Likert scales ranging from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree). 
a. “I think the other participant made the volunteering decision in task 1 with the purpose of influencing me 
in task 2.” 
b. “I made the volunteering decision in task 1 with the purpose of influencing the other participant in task 
2.” 
c. “If the other participant chose to volunteer in task 1, he or she is more likely to allocate high resources in 
task 2 than if he or she chose not to volunteer in task 1.” 
d. “I see myself as someone who is generally trusting.” 
e. “I would feel guilty not allocating high resources to the project if the other participant chose to volunteer 
in task 1.” 
My theory also suggests that, compared to strategic settings, volunteers in non-
strategic settings are more likely to infer others’ types from their volunteering decisions. 
To measure volunteers’ belief that others’ volunteering behavior reveals their type, in the 
post-experimental questionnaire I ask participants to indicate the extent to which they agree 
with the following statement, “If the other participant chose to volunteer in task 1, he or 
she is more likely to allocate high resources in task 2 than if he or she chose not to volunteer 
in task 1”, on a Likert scale ranging from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree). 
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Consistent with the theory, volunteers’ average response to this question, labeled Belief, is 
higher in Non-Strategic conditions than in Strategic conditions (p = 0.069, one-tailed). In 
addition, in Non-Strategic conditions, a logit regression finds that volunteers’ cooperation 
decision is significantly related to Belief (p = 0.062, two-tailed). However, this relationship 
is not significant in Strategic conditions (p = 0.104, two-tailed). These results provide 
evidence that volunteers are willing to cooperate when they view others’ volunteering 
behavior as a credible signal of their type, but not when they become suspicious about the 
credibility of the signal.   
Some individuals may be inherently more trusting than others. To test whether this 
personality trait affects my results, in the post-experimental questionnaire I measure 
participants’ general tendency to trust by asking them to indicate the extent to which they 
agree with the following statement, “I see myself as someone who is generally more 
trusting,” on a Likert scale ranging from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree). 
Whereas volunteers in the Non-Strategic conditions perceive themselves as more trusting 
than non-volunteers (p = 0.021, two-tailed), volunteers and non-volunteers in the Strategic 
conditions do not differ in their general tendency to trust (p = 1, two-tailed). These findings 
suggest that in non-strategic settings, volunteering programs act as an effective screening 
mechanism in selecting employees of certain characteristics. However, the selection 
benefit of volunteering programs diminishes in strategic settings.10 I repeat the hypotheses 
tests after including participants’ general tendency to trust as a covariate. All of the 
                                                 
10 Prior research suggests that agreeableness, one of the Big Five personality traits, is a significant 
antecedent of employee volunteering (Carlo et al. 2005). As individuals who score high on agreeableness 
tend to be more altruistic and trusting (Graziano 1994), it is possible that the general tendency to trust 
measure captures agreeableness to some extent.  
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statistical inferences remain unchanged. Therefore, although volunteers in Non-Strategic 
conditions identity themselves as more trusting in general, they do not unconditionally trust 
others more in social dilemmas. Instead, they are more willing to cooperate only when they 
perceive others to be of the same pro-social type.  
My theory suggests that the volunteering decision serves as a signal of employees’ 
pro-sociality and the signal is less credible in more strategic settings. While the results of 
hypotheses tests are consistent with my theory, a possible alternative explanation is that 
employees appreciate others’ volunteering decision and view their own cooperation as a 
way to “reward” volunteers. That is, employees are more willing to cooperate with 
volunteers not because they perceive volunteers as more trustworthy in cooperative settings, 
but rather because they want to avoid the guilt of mistreating more pro-social colleagues. 
The impact of such guilt aversion on cooperation is weaker in more strategic settings where 
the volunteering decision is less reflective of individuals’ pro-sociality. I measure 
participants’ perception of guilt by asking them to indicate the extent to which they agree 
with the following statement, “I would feel guilty not allocating high resources to the 
project if the other participant chose to volunteer in task 1,” on a Likert scale ranging from 
1 (Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree). Participants’ response to this question does 
not differ significantly across the Strategic and Non-Strategic conditions (p = 0.334, two-
tailed), indicating that guilt aversion cannot explain the observed pattern of cooperation, 





CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSIONS 
This study examines whether and how employee volunteering programs can serve 
as an informal control mechanism that facilitates cooperation in collaborative 
environments. Employees who participated in volunteering programs are likely to be 
cooperative, conditioning on the expectation that others will also cooperate. Therefore, 
volunteering programs can help improve cooperation by enabling conditional cooperators 
to signal their type and identify others’ type. However, the extent to which employees rely 
on such signals to make cooperation decisions depends on the perceived credibility of the 
signal. If there are opportunities for others to strategically signal their type by volunteering, 
the credibility of the signal will be questionable. As a result, employees are less likely to 
rely on the signal to make their cooperation decisions. I conduct a two-stage experiment to 
test these predictions and find that, in settings where volunteering can genuinely reflect 
one’s pro-social attributes, cooperation rate is higher when the participant and his partner 
both volunteered than otherwise. However, in settings where volunteering could be driven 
by other personal motives, it no longer has a significant impact on subsequent cooperation 
decisions.  
My study extends the accounting literature on management control in cooperative 
settings. Given the prevalent use of teams in modern organizations, it is important to 
understand how different types and components of management control systems improve 
cooperation among team members. My results suggest that employee volunteering 
programs can facilitate cooperation by providing signals about employees’ propensity to 
cooperate, but only when employees’ volunteer decisions are perceived as non-strategic. 
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My study also has important implications for CSR practices by identifying an 
undocumented benefit of volunteering programs and how the realization of such benefits 
are moderated by contextual factors that affect the perceived motive underlying 
volunteering. While these contextual factors (e.g., public recognition) may attract more 
employees to participate in volunteering programs, they could undermine the benefits of 
such programs for enhancing cooperative performance. In practice, firms may adopt 
volunteering programs to achieve different purposes, such as improving employees’ 
morale (Caligiuri et al. 2003) and developing employees’ leadership skills (Wainwright 
2005). In designing and executing employee volunteering programs, firms need to consider 
the main purpose they aim to achieve and tailor the program to maximize the likelihood of 
achieving the goal. 
Some limitations of this study could be addressed in future research. First, in my 
experiment I use a one-shot prisoners’ dilemma game, yet in practice individuals in 
cooperative settings often interact repeatedly. In repeated games without institutional 
remedies such as communication and punishment, voluntary cooperation is often fragile 
and declines over time. Prior research suggests that mechanisms that allow conditional 
cooperators to identify and monitor each other can help sustain cooperation in repeated 
games (Rustagi et al. 2010). It would be interesting to examine whether and how 
volunteering programs can serve as such a mechanism to facilitate reputation-building. 
Second, employees in my study cannot select whom they are paired with. Future research 
can examine how volunteering programs affect employees’ selection of employers and 
work partners, and how employees interact with each other after the selection. Third, prior 
research suggests that participation in volunteering programs can be driven by 
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compensatory motives (Grant 2012). Specifically, if employees perceive their regular job 
as boring and meaningless, they may seek to obtain meaningfulness from volunteering. 
Future research could distinguish between different types of non-strategic motives of 
volunteering and examine how employees perceive and react to these motives. Last, while 
my study examines volunteering, a helping behavior towards individuals outside the 
organization, it would be interesting to study how helping behaviors among employees can 








APPENDIX A. EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUMENT – STAGE ONE 
For the purpose of this study, suppose that you are a market research analyst for ABC 
Company, a manufacturer and retailer of home improvement products. 
ABC Company has an Employee Volunteer Program where employees volunteer at local 
and national nonprofit organizations. Every year, employees can take up to 60 hours of 
paid time off volunteering at qualified nonprofit organizations. Now, the Employee 
Volunteer Program provides an opportunity to volunteer at XYZ, a national nonprofit 
organization that offers a wider variety of low income assistance programs. XYZ’s mission 
is to help low-income families achieve sustainable independence through community 
resources.  
The Employee Volunteer Program at XYZ helps low-income individuals identify career 
options and develop workforce skills. The program has helped hundreds of participants 
find full-time jobs that enable them to better support their families. If you join the program, 
your responsibilities would include helping organize a series of employment preparation 
workshops and acting as mock interviewers in some workshops. Also, you would help with 
promoting the program and attracting more volunteers. 
Your company is currently providing a series of information sessions. The purpose of these 
sessions is to inform employees about the new trends in the industry, such as new 
technology and potential changes in the market. Participation in these sessions is not 
mandatory. Employees can freely decide whether they would like to attend the information 
sessions based on their need and schedule.  
Non-Strategic conditions: 
Because your time is limited, you will decide whether you would like to participate in the 
Employee Volunteer Program by volunteering at XYZ, or attend the information sessions 
at your company. Now please choose one of the options on the computer and briefly explain 
why on the next page.  
Strategic conditions: 
Because your time is limited, you will decide whether you would like to participate in the 
Employee Volunteer Program by volunteering at XYZ, or attend the information sessions 





APPENDIX B. EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUMENT – STAGE TWO 
Task 2 involves decision making in an organizational setting. You will be randomly paired 
with another participant. We will use a currency called "Lira."  The Lira you earn will be 
converted into dollars (details described later), and you will be paid in private in cash at 
the end of the study based on your participant ID.    
 
Please read the instructions carefully because the amount of money you earn may depend 
on the decisions that you make. You will take a quiz after reading the instructions.  No one 




You and the other participant in your group will each decide how to allocate resources to 
a joint project. Specifically, you will each choose whether to allocate high or low resources 
to the project. The allocated resources will determine the performance of the project, which 
in turn will determine a bonus for you and the other participant (detail provided below). If 
you allocate high resources to the project, you will incur a personal cost of 1000 Lira, which 
will be subtracted from your bonus to determine your net payoff. If you allocate low 
resources to the project, there will be no personal cost.  
- If you and the other participant both allocate high resources to the project, its 
performance will be high and the bonus will be 5000 Lira. The bonus will be shared 
equally between you two. That is, you and the other participant will each receive 2500 
Lira. The net payoff for you and the other participant will be 2500 – the personal cost 
of 1000 = 1500 Lira. 
 
- If either you or the other participant (but not both) allocates high resources to the 
project, its performance will be average, and the bonus will be 4000 Lira. The bonus 
will be shared equally between you two. That is, you and the other participant will each 
receive 2000 Lira. The net payoff for the person who chose high resources will be 2000 
– the personal cost of 1000 = 1000 Lira, and the net payoff for the person who chose 
low resources will be 2000 – 0 = 2000 Lira. 
 
- If you and the other participant both allocate low resources to the project, its 
performance will be low, and the bonus will be 2400 Lira. The bonus will be shared 
equally between you two. That is, you and the other participant will each receive 1200 
Lira. The net payoff for you and the other participant will be 1200 – 0 = 1200 Lira. 
 
Recall that the other participant will make exactly the same decision as you. You will each 
make your choice without knowing the other’s choice. The table below summarizes the net 
payoff for you and the other participant based on possible combinations of the level of 
resources allocated to the project. 
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Your allocation to 
the joint project 
The other 
participant’s 










Low Low 1200 1200 
Low High 2000 1000 
High Low 1000 2000 
High High 1500 1500 
 
You will make the allocation decision in two possible situations:  
1. You will decide whether to allocate high or low resources to the project if the other 
participant in your group chose to participate in the Employee Volunteer Program 
in task 1.  
2. You will decide whether to allocate high or low resources to the project if the other 
participant chose not to participate in the Employee Volunteer Program in task 1.  
That is, you will make these two decisions without knowing whether the other participant 
participated in the Employee Volunteer Program in task 1. Later, depending on whether or 
not the other participant actually participated, we will use either Decision 1 (i.e., if the other 
participant actually participated in the Employee Volunteer Program) or Decision 2 (i.e., if 
the other participant did not participate) to determine your payoff.  
The other participant in your group will make exactly the same two decisions, and will 
receive a payoff determined the same way. 
For example, suppose that you decide to allocate high resources to the project if the other 
participant in your group participated in the Employee Volunteer Program in task 1 and 
allocate low resources if the other participant did not participate.  
- If the other participant actually did not participate, your allocation to the project 
will be “low.” And if the other participant made the same two choices as you, and 
you actually did not participate, his/her allocation will be “low.” Therefore, you 
and the other participant will each receive 1200 Lira (refer to the table above).   
- If the other participant actually participated, your allocation will be “high.” And if 
the other participant made the same two choices as you, and you did not participate, 
his/her allocation will be “low.” Therefore, you will receive 1,000 Lira and the 
other participant will receive 2,000 Lira.   
At the end of the experiment, the Lira you earn will be converted to dollars at a rate of 250 
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